This paper provides an investigation of the role of momentum and social learning in sequential voting systems. In the econometric model, voters are uncertain over candidate quality, and voters in late states attempt to infer the information held by those in early states from voting returns. Candidates experience momentum effects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations. The empirical application focuses on the responses of daily polling data to the release of voting returns in the 2004 presidential primary. We find that Kerry benefited from surprising wins in early states and took votes away from Dean, who held a strong lead prior to the beginning of the primary season. The voting weights implied by the estimated model demonstrate that early voters have up to 20 times the influence of late voters in the selection of candidates, demonstrating a significant departure from the ideal of "one person, one vote." We then address several alternative, non-learning explanations for our results. Finally, we run simulations under different electoral structures and find that a simultaneous election would have been more competitive due to the absence of herding and that alternative sequential structures would have yielded different outcomes.
Introduction
While voting occurs simultaneously in many elections, voters choose sequentially in other cases, such as in roll-call voting in legislatures and in general elections for many federal o ces prior to 1872. The most widely discussed example of a sequential election, however, is the Presidential primary. As shown in Figure 1 When considering such changes in the primary schedule, one naturally wonders whether or not the order of voting matters. That is, do outcomes of primaries depend upon the sequencing of states? Relatedly, do sequential, relative to simultaneous, systems lead to di erent outcomes in terms of the selection of candidates? And, if so, why? In our view, as well as the view of others, the key distinction is that sequential, relative to simultaneous, elections provide late voters with an opportunity to learn about the desirability of the various candidates from the behavior of early voters. This opportunity for late voters to learn from early voting returns can in turn lead to momentum e ects, de ned as a positive e ect of candidate performance in early states on candidate performance in later states.
While conventional wisdom holds that such momentum e ects are important in sequential elections, any econometric attempt to identify their existence and measure their magnitude faces several challenges. First, what is the informational content of voting returns from early states? Do the absolute returns matter or should results be measured relative to voter expectations regarding candidate performance? If returns should be gauged relative to expectations, how can these expectations be measured? Second, how should researchers account for unmeasured candidate characteristics? The fact that eventual winners tend to do well in early states has often been interpreted as evidence of momentum e ects. But success in both early and late states could simply re ect underlying candidate strength, which is often unobserved by the econometrician. Said di erently, winners in early states might have won the overall primary even with a simultaneous primary system under which momentum e ects play no role. Third, how do voters weigh the voting returns from di erent states? For example, how should voters in states third in the sequence, such as those in South Carolina, weigh the returns from Iowa, the rst state, relative to those from New Hampshire, the second state. A similar question is how do voters account for the fact that voters in states earlier in the sequence might also condition on returns from even earlier states?
More concretely, when attempting to learn about the desirability of candidates from voting returns in Iowa and New Hampshire, how do voters in South Carolina account for the fact that, before casting their ballots, voters in New Hampshire may have also conditioned their decisions on voting returns in Iowa?
In this paper we attempt to overcome these econometric challenges through the development of a simple discrete choice econometric model of voting and social learning. In the model voters are uncertain about candidate quality, which is valued by all voters regardless of their ideology and can be interpreted, for example, as competence or integrity. Voters gather information about quality during the campaign, and voters in late states attempt to uncover the information of early voters from voting returns in these states. In the context of this model we show that candidates bene t from momentum e ects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations. Momentum is thus not exclusive to winners, who may actually experience reverse momentum e ects if their margin of victory is smaller than expected. The degree of such momentum e ects depends upon a variety of factors, including voters' prior beliefs about the quality of candidates, expectations about candidate performance, and the degree of variation in state-level preferences.
In order to estimate the degree of social learning in sequential elections, we examine voting in the 2004 Democratic primaries. In particular, we examine reactions of respondents from late states in daily polling data to the revelation of aggregate voting returns in early states. To the extent that social learning is important, unexpected strength in voting returns from early states should lead to improved candidate evaluation by voters in late states in the daily polling data. The parameters of interest are those governing the social learning process and are chosen to re ect the dynamics in the polling data. Our estimates demonstrate substantial momentum e ects. Using the estimated model, we examine how implied voting weights di er depending upon location in the voting sequence. We next address several alternative, non-learning explanations for our momentum results. Finally, we use the model to simulate electoral outcomes under a counterfactual simultaneous election and also alternative primary calendars.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 lays out the basic theoretical and econometric model of momentum in primaries. Section 4 describes our empirical application, section 5 describes the counterfactual simulations, and section 6 describes possible extensions and summarizes our key ndings.
Literature Review
Welch (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) , and Banerjee (1992) provide the rst formal analysis of social learning. Agents choose actions sequentially and are uncertain about the correct action, which depends upon the state of the world. Payo s are thus correlated and agents may attempt to learn the correct action from the behavior of others. If agents are su ciently unsure about the true state of the world then they may ignore their private signals and simply follow the actions of others. Such behavior has become known alternatively as informational cascades or herding. Such cascades are fragile in the sense that small changes in early signals can lead to large changes in subsequent behavior. Also, cascades can lead to ine cient outcomes if realized early signals are outliers and thus not representative of the true state of the world.
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A key question is whether these social learning results extend to the context of sequential elections, with the main distinction being that voters make a social choice, and individual payo s thus depend upon the actions of all agents. Under strategic voting, rational agents recognize that their individual action only matters if they are pivotal, de ned as situations in which their vote changes the voting outcome. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) rst address this issue in the context of a model with a binary, symmetric, and simultaneous election. Given that pivotal 1 This social learning framework has been applied in a variety of empirical settings. Welch (2000) , for example, studies herding among security analysts. For a general overview of social learning in nance, see Devenow and Welch (1996) . In development economics, social learning has been shown to play a key role in the choice of technology, such as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Munshi (2004) . Cai, Chen, and Fang (2007) conduct a eld experiment in which the top selling dishes were posted in restaurant menus and nd that these postings are in uential for orders and especially so for infrequent customers. Finally, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2007) provide a social learning explanation for aggregation reversals, where an individual relationship, such as income and ideology, is reversed at some level of aggregation, such as the state-level. For a more comprehensive overview of the social learning literature, see the survey by Sushil, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) and Chamley (2004). voters are choosing candidates based upon their private signal, the selected candidate is the same regardless of whether voters observe only their private information or whether all information is public.
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Dekel and Piccione (2000) extend this result to sequential elections under binary and symmetric environments and show that every equilibrium of the simultaneous game is also an equilibrium of the sequential game, regardless of the sequence. Strategic voters condition on being pivotal and hence behave as if they know that all other voters are evenly divided between the two candidates. Thus there is a symmetry between early and late voters and it does not matter which candidate is supported by the early voters. It is important to note, however, that this result does not demonstrate an equivalence between simultaneous and sequential elections; due to multiplicity, there are equilibria of the sequential game that are not equilibria of the simultaneous game. In particular, Ali and Kartik (2006) construct an equilibrium in posterior-based voting in the context of a sequential election. In this equilibrium if other voters play history dependent strategies then it is individually optimal for each and every voter to do so as well even under strategic voting.
Intuitively, if all other voters condition on history then early votes are more informative than late votes, breaking the symmetry underlying the Dekel and Piccione (2000) result. These posteriorbased strategies can be interpreted as sequential analogues to sincere voting under simultaneous elections, providing support for our sincerity assumption to be described below.
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In addition to social learning, several authors have suggested alternative models for momentum, both at the voter and candidate level. Callander (2007) proposes a model where every voter gains utility from both conforming, de ned as supporting the eventual winner, and voting informatively, de ned as supporting the best candidate based on their belief about the true state of the world. As the number of voters increases, the conforming component of utility dominates the information-based component and herding results, propelling the leading candidate to victory.
On the candidate side, Klumpp and Polborn (2006) specify a model in which an early primary victory increases the likelihood of victory for one candidate and creates an asymmetry in campaign spending that furthers this advantage. Starting with two symmetric candidates, if one candidate randomly wins the rst election, this winner will have a greater incentive to spend in subsequent elections while the loser will have a diminished incentive. Through this asymmetry of campaign spending, momentum is generated and can lead an early winner to overall victory. Finally, Strumpf (2002) discusses a countervailing force to momentum. In particular, a candidate who is expected to win several of the last elections can credibly commit to not dropping out of the race even if he is trailing early. From the perspective of opposing candidates, this commitment both increases the costs of running and decreases the probability of winning. This e ect, which favors later winners, thus moves in the opposite direction of momentum, which favors early winners, and may make measurement of either e ect more di cult.
Most of the empirical work on momentum has come from the political science literature. Bartels (1987 and 1988) While we nd these papers to be both interesting and suggestive of momentum e ects, they do not fully overcome the econometric challenges described in the introduction. In order to better address the challenges associated with measuring momentum e ects, we believe that it is desirable to build an empirical model from microfoundations, and the next section provides such a framework for measurement.
Theoretical framework
This section lays out our basic theoretical and econometric framework for measuring momentum e ects in sequential elections, and the notation here follows Chamley (2002) . Given our empirical motivations, we keep things simple and make the assumptions necessary to generate a tractable empirical model. Many of these assumptions, however, will be discussed and relaxed in the 4 There have also been experimental tests for momentum e ects. Morton and Williams (1999) consider a model with three candidates, liberal, moderate, and conservative. Voters do not observe candidate ideology but can potentially learn about ideology from past voting. Partisan voters (liberal or conservative) are risk averse and thus would rather vote for the moderate if they believe that only the moderate and the opposing candidate have a chance of winning. The authors test this hypotheses in a laboratory setting and nd that later voters do use the early results and that a sequential election increases the likelihood of victory for moderate, unknown candidates. In addition, Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2005) test predictions of the sequential voting model of Battaglini (2005) , which incorporates costly voting and endogenous turnout. empirical section to follow.
Setup
Consider a set of states (s) choosing between candidates (c = 0; 1; :::; C) in a sequential election, where the order of voting is taken as given. We allow for the possibility that multiple states may vote on the same day; in particular, let t be the set of states voting on date t and let N t 1 be the size of this set.
Voter i residing in state s is assumed to receive the following payo from candidate c winning the election:
where q c represents the quality of candidate c; cs represents a state-speci c preference for candidate c; and cis represents an individual preference for candidate c and is assumed to be distributed type-I extreme value and independently across both candidates and voters. We normalize utility from the baseline candidate to be zero for all voters (u 0is = 0): While underlying preferences are assumed to be stable, or time-independent, there is uncertainty and expectations may evolve during the election, as described below.
We assume the following information structure. Voters know their own state-level preference ( cs ) but not those in other states. Voters do, however, know the distribution from which these state-level preferences are drawn. In particular, we assume that state-level preferences are normally distributed [ cs N (0;
2 )] and independently across states. We further assume that voters are uncertain over candidate quality and are Bayesian. In particular, initial (t = 1) priors over candidate quality (q c ) are assumed to be normally distributed with a candidate-speci c mean c1 and a variance 2 1 that is common across candidates. Under the assumptions to follow, the posterior distribution will be normal as well. Before going to the polls, all voters in state s receive a noisy signal ( cs ) over the quality of candidate c :
where the noise in the signal is assumed to be normally distributed [" cs N (0; 2 " )] and independently across states: These signals can be interpreted in a variety of ways, including personal meetings with candidates, media coverage of candidate debates within the state, endorsements of candidates by either local media outlets or local politicians, political advertising on local television channels, media coverage of candidate appearances in the state, etc. We assume that this signal is common within a state but is unobserved by voters in other states.
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Given the state-level signal ( cs ); expected utility for voter i in state s from candidate c winning can be written as follows:
Finally, regarding voter behavior, we assume sincere voting. That is, given the information available to voter i in state s at time t, voters support the candidate who maximizes their expected utility.
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We thus abstract from several forms of strategic voting under which optimal voter behavior may depend upon the behavior of other voters. Importantly, these forms of strategic voting can also generate momentum e ects that are unrelated to social learning, and this issue of alternative explanations for any measured momentum e ects will be discussed more completely below in the empirical application.
Voting behavior
Then, for voters in state s observing a signal over quality ( cs ) and with a prior given by ( ct ; 2 t ); private updating over quality is given by:
where the weight on the signal is given by:
We feel that this assumption of a common signal within states is reasonable given the role of the mass media in modern elections. However, some campaign messages, such as mailings, can be targeted to individual voters, suggesting an alternative formulation that would allow for voters within the same state to receive independent signals. This formulation implies that, in the absence of heterogeneity in state-level preferences ( 2 = 0); quality is perfectly revealed by voting returns from states with large populations. Thus, voters will learn only from returns in the rst state and will ignore both their private signals and voting returns from other states thereafter. We view this feature of a model with individual-level signals as both unattractive and unrealistic and thus focus on the case of state-level signals. One could also consider a hybrid model with both individual-level and state-level signals. While this formulation would overcome the problem of perfect revelation of quality after voting in the rst state, as described above, it is not clear how the variance in these two signals, which is a key parameter of interest in the empirical analysis to follow, would be separately identi ed.
Re ecting well-known results in the literature on Bayesian learning, voters thus place more weight on their private signal the higher is the variance in the prior over quality ( 2 t ) and the lower is the degree of noise in the signal ( 2 " ): Given this updating rule, aggregate vote shares in state s voting at time t can be described as follows:
where v cst is the vote share for candidate c and v 0st is the vote share for the baseline candidate.
Thus, the log-odds ratio can be expressed as a linear combination of state-level preferences ( cs ), the signal ( cs ) received by voters in state s, and the mean of the quality distribution ( ct ) prior to the realization of the signal, where the relative weight on the latter two terms depends upon the parameter t . As will be seen below, this expression for aggregate voting returns provides the key link between the individual-level voting data and the aggregate returns in the econometric formulation, and the linearity will be a particularly attractive feature in the analysis of social learning from early voting returns.
Social learning and momentum
From the perspective of measuring momentum, the key question is then how voters in late states update their beliefs over quality upon observing vote shares in early states (i.e. E(q c jv cst ; v 0st )).
Given that state-level preferences ( cs ) are unobserved by voters in other states, signals ( cs ) cannot be inferred directly from vote shares in equation (6). Using the fact that cs = q c + " cs ;
however, we can say that transformed vote shares provide a noisy signal of quality:
where the noise in the voting signal includes the noise in the quality signal (" cs ) but also the noise due to the unobserved state preferences ( ct = t ); the combined variance of the noise in the voting signal thus equals ( 2 = 2 t ) + 2 " : Given N t 1 such signals, the posterior distribution is also normal and can thus be characterized by its rst two moments:
where the weight on the voting signals is given by:
Before describing the evolution of the mean of the belief distribution, we note that the precision of the posterior, de ned as the inverse of the variance (1= 2 t+1 ), is increasing in the number of states (N t ) voting at time t along with the degree of precision in these voting returns [(
To provide further interpretation of this social learning rule, it is useful to re-write equation (8) as follows:
Social learning ( ct+1 ct ) thus depends upon the surprises in voting returns, de ned as the deviations in vote shares from expectations over candidate performance. Interestingly, this learning rule implies that candidates who do not win the primary in state s can still bene t from momentum e ects so long as they perform well relative to expectations. At the same time, candidates who win primaries may actually experience reverse momentum e ects in the event that their margin of victory is smaller than expected.
To provide a sense of the degree of social learning, note that the e ect of an increase in vote shares on the mean of the posterior distribution of candidate quality can be expressed as follows:
Interestingly, this parameter is less than one, re ecting the inability of voters in late states to perfectly infer signals from vote shares in early states due to their inability to observe state-level preferences of voters in other states. Relatedly, the social learning parameter is decreasing in the degree of heterogeneity in state-level preferences ( 2 ). Moreover, for the special case of single-state primaries at time t (N t = 1), such as in Iowa and New Hampshire, we can say that the degree of social learning is decreasing in the degree of noise in the signal ( 2 " ) and is increasing in the variance of the prior ( 2 t ). An important implicit assumption in the above formulation is that expectations over electoral outcomes, as captured by ct in equation 11, depend upon national, but not state-speci c, factors.
We make this assumption for two reasons. First, national polls reveal national preferences ( ct ), while state-speci c polls reveal both national and state-level preferences ( ct + cs ): Thus, with both types of polls, voters can uncover state-speci c preferences ( cs ); and this inference would violate our assumption that voters cannot observe state-level preferences in other states. If voters can learn state-speci c preferences, then the signal can be uncovered from voting returns in equation 6, and the key social learning parameter in this case would be given by (
) and equals one for single-state primary days (N t = 1); such as Iowa and New Hampshire. Thus, social learning would be assumed, rather than measured, in our empirical application to follow.
Second, while state-speci c polling data was often reported in the media for Iowa and New Hampshire, polls in other states were reported far less frequently, if at all, and it is thus far from clear that voters had this information for all states. National polls, by contrast, were readily available on a high-frequency basis. Finally, we should note that this assumption (expectations depend purely on national factors) is much stronger than we need, and we relax this assumption in one of the alternative speci cations, which assumes that some state-speci c factors are observed and that others are unobserved. What is crucial to our result is that state-level preferences are not perfectly observed by voters in other states.
Empirical Application
Our empirical application focuses on the 2004 Democratic primary. During the months leading up to the primary season, Howard Dean, governor of Vermont, held a substantial lead in opinion polls.
After his third place nish in the Iowa caucuses, however, Dean soon lost that lead in opinion polls to the Iowa winner, John Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts, and was forced to withdraw after a disappointing performance in Wisconsin. Kerry continued his success in Iowa with a win in New Hampshire and with strong performances in all of the subsequent states. The only serious challenge to Kerry after Iowa came from John Edwards, a senator from North Carolina, who came in a surprisingly strong second in Iowa and proceeded to win in South Carolina and Oklahoma.
Edwards was forced to withdraw, however, on March 3, the day after a string of second-place nishes to Kerry on Super Tuesday. Finally, as will be described below, we aim to estimate the state-speci c preference parameters 
Data

Empirical Model
As noted above, our empirical strategy for identifying momentum e ects involves measuring reactions of voting intentions of likely voters in polling data to aggregate voting returns in state primaries. In our econometric speci cation, we assume that these voters have not yet observed their private signals and their voting intentions can thus be summarized as follows:
To better understand our empirical strategy for estimating the parameters governing the learning process, it is useful to rst note that voter updating over quality can be summarized by the weight on private signals, the weight on public signals, updating over the mean, and updating over the variance as follows:
As seen, with information regarding the initial priors ( c1 ; 2 1 ) along with the parameters 2 " and 2 , one can compute the weight on the private signal in the rst period ( 1 ) and, with this weight in hand, one can then compute the weight placed upon the public voting signals in the rst period ( 1 ). Then, with the entire set of rst-period values ( c1 ; 2 1 ; 1 ; 1 ); along with information on rst-period voting returns, we can successively compute the second-period values ( c2 ; 2 2 ; 2 ; 2 ): With these second-period values, along with information on second-period voting returns, we can then successively compute the third-period values ( c3 ; 2 3 ; 3 ; 3 ), etc. Thus, it should be clear that the key parameters to be estimated are the distribution of the initial priors ( c1 ; 2 1 ) along with the variance in state-level preferences (
2 ) and the degree of noise in the signal ( 2 " ): These key parameters are estimated via a two-step approach. In the rst step, we use the pre-Iowa polls to estimate the initial conditions. In particular, for the case of t = 1, we have that:
We estimate the state-level preference parameters ( cs ), which are normalized to sum to zero and which can be used to calculate 2 ; along with a constant term, which provides an estimate of c1 . In the second step, we use reactions of voters in post-Iowa opinion polls to the revelation of voting returns in other states in order to estimate the key parameters ( 2 " ; 2 1 ) governing the social learning process. Given the two-stage estimation approach, conventional con dence intervals will not re ect the uncertainty associated with using generated regressors in the second stage. We address this issue by computing bootstrap con dence intervals. Table 1 provides the results from the rst-step of the estimation procedure. As shown in columns 1 and 2, the coe cient on the candidate-speci c constant term demonstrates Dean's substantial lead over Kerry and Kerry's lead over Edwards prior to the commencement of the primary season.
Baseline Results
As noted above, this coe cient can be interpreted as the mean of the initial prior ( c1 ); and this variable will play a key role in the updating rule given by equation (16). The signi cant degree of variation in the state speci c coe cients demonstrates the signi cant diversity in preferences for the candidates across states. As shown, there are strong regional e ects with Kerry holding a substantial advantage in his home state of Massachusetts, and Edwards enjoying a corresponding strong advantage in the South, with statistically signi cant advantages over Kerry in North Carolina and South Carolina. This advantage likely re ects the fact that Edwards was the only candidate of the three from the South. This issue of regional advantages will be considered below in an alternative speci cation, which relaxes the assumption that such advantages are unobserved by voters in later states. Given the di culties in providing a direct social learning interpretation of these parameters, we instead present in Figures 6-9 the key dynamics of the model as implied by these estimated parameters and the aggregate returns. As shown in Figure 6 , for example, the degree of variance in the beliefs over candidate quality ( 2 t ) falls substantially over the primary season. Prior to the Iowa caucus, the variance in this distribution was around 3.5, re ecting the estimated parameter in Table 2 , but falls to around 0.5 by March 2, or Super Tuesday. Thus, voters learn a substantial amount over the course of the campaign about candidate quality purely from the release of voting returns in other states.
At the same time as the degree of uncertainty over candidate quality fell, voters learned about the quality of the candidates relative to one another. As shown in Figure 7 , prior to the primary season, voters viewed Dean as the highest quality followed by Kerry and Edwards, re ecting the pattern of coe cients on the candidate indicator variables in Table 1 . Following Kerry's win in Iowa, Kerry pulled ahead of Dean in terms of mean quality ratings. Although Kerry defeated Edwards in Iowa, voters updated favorably over Edwards relative to Kerry, re ecting the fact candidates can bene t, even relative to rst place nishers, from surprisingly strong second place nishers. On the other hand, although Edwards defeated Dean in Iowa, voters still evaluated Dean and Edwards roughly equally. This in turn re ects the fact that voters also placed some weight on their beliefs prior to voting in Iowa, and these priors were strongly in favor of Dean relative to Edwards. Following New Hampshire and mini-Super Tuesday, Kerry held a strong advantage, and Dean never recovered from his weak performances in Iowa.
To provide further interpretation of these results, Figure 8 plots the implied weights on the private signals observed by voters ( t ) as well as the weights placed upon aggregate vote shares after scaling by the number of primaries ( t =N t ). As shown, voters place less weight on their prior than on the private signal at the beginning of the sample period. This in turn re ects the fact that the estimated degree of noise in the signal is less than the estimated degree of variance in the initial prior ( 2 " < 2 1 ) and that the weight on the private signal can be shown to be inversely related to the ratio of these parameters (i.e. t = (1 + While the weights on private and public signals seem to fall in a similar parallel manner in Figure 8 , the weight on the public signal is quickly approaching zero, and hence the ratio of these two weights ( t = t N t ); which is the key social learning parameter, also falls quickly to zero.
This pattern in social learning is re ected in Figure 9 , where voters in late states initially learn substantially from returns in early states. The initial weight on the public signal is roughly 75 percent of the weight on the private signal. This social learning, however, falls o quickly and the weight on the public signal is around 10 percent of the weight on the private signal by the end of the sample period.
In summary, our estimated model demonstrates that voters in late states placed signi cant weight on Kerry's early victories. It is the deviations from expectations that matters, however, and Edwards bene tted relative to Kerry from a surprisingly strong second-place nish in Iowa.
While Dean came in third place in Iowa, he bene tted from strong voter beliefs regarding his quality prior to Iowa and was able to remain viable. At the same time that voters shifted their relative evaluations of candidate quality, they became increasingly con dent in these evaluations, and voters in late states thus placed less weight on both their private signals as well from returns in other states. Taken together, these results demonstrate signi cant momentum e ects as re ected in the e ect of early returns on the choices of late voters.
Implied Voting Weights
Due to these documented momentum e ects, early voters have a disproportionate in uence over the selection of candidates. This over-weighting of early voters associated with sequential voting thus leads to potential deviations from the democratic ideal of \one person, one vote." While this property of sequential voting has been frequently discussed in policy debates over the design of the primary system, there is little evidence on the degree of this disproportionate in uence.
Interestingly, we can use the estimated model to explicitly calculate the voting weights associated with sequential voting in the 2004 primary.
Our rst measure of voting weights is based upon the e ect of changes in state-level preferences ( cs ) on candidate vote shares:
where v c is the vote-share for candidate c averaged across all states. In the absence of momentum e ects, the impact of a change in voter preferences should be equal across all states. With momentum e ects, by contrast, changes in voter preferences in early states will lead to changes in vote shares in that period but in all subsequent states as well. We compute this derivative for one state voting on each of the primary dates (t = 1; 2; ::; 10) and, normalizing the in uence of the nal period to 1, this derivative provides a measure of the weight placed upon state-level preferences.
11 As shown in Figure 10 , preferences of voters from the state of Iowa, the rst state to vote, have almost six times the in uence of the states voting on Super Tuesday (t = 10).
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Our second measure is based upon the e ect of changes in state-level information ( cs ) on candidate vote shares:
11 In particular, we increase state-level preferences by one unit and re-compute vote shares for that state, as expressed in equation 6. In order to predict vote shares for subsequent states, we re-compute the posterior mean quality, as expressed in equation 8, and ultimately vote shares, as expressed in equation 6. Note that simulating these vote shares requires explicit measures of the voting signal ( cs), which can be backed out of equation 6 with information over state-level preferences ( cs).
12 A shock to a state in period t+1 may have a larger impact on overall vote share than a shock to a state in period t, despite having a shorter duration. This is a result of the non-linear relationship between votes shares and shocks, making the overall impact of a shock depend upon the pre-shock vote share. If we calculate weights using the log vote ratio instead of vote share we nd that the weight is monotonically decreasing in t. As shown in Figure 11 , the information held by Iowa voters has roughly 20 times the in uence of information held by Super Tuesday voters. These information-based weights are substanially larger than the preference-based weights, as described above, given that voters in late states place less weight on their own signal. This under-weighting of signals has a direct e ect in the calculation of voting weights but also has an indirect e ect as late vote shares are thus a noisier signal of quality. Taken together, these results con rm the often-held notion that early states have a disproportionate in uence over the selection of candidates in sequential primary systems and thus represents a signi cant departure from \one person, one vote."
Additional speci cations
As noted above, the baseline model assumes that voters observe their own state-level preferences but not those in other states. What is key to the social learning result is that some component of state-level preferences is unobserved by voters in other states, and thus voters in late states cannot perfectly infer signals from voting returns in early states. If preferences are perfectly observed, then, as noted above, in the case of a single primary (N t = 1), public and private learning are equivalent ( t = t ) and momentum e ects are e ectively assumed, rather than measured. As an alternative to this assumption of perfect observability, we consider and estimate a speci cation in which state-level preferences consist of both an unobserved component ( cs ) and an observed component (X cs ), such as geography, which could capture advantages enjoyed by politicians campaigning in their home states. Then, aggregate voting returns can be written as follows:
where is a weight, or vector of weights, on observed preferences that will be estimated. It is then straightforward to show that the social learning rule is adjusted for these observed characteristics as follows:
Thus, voters in late states incorporate these observed state-level characteristics into their expectations of candidate performance, and, in our example of geography, returns showing that a candidate performed well in his home state, even relative to national expectations over candidate performance ( ct ); do not necessarily lead to momentum e ects.
To operationalize this speci cation, we incorporate into X cs a measure of the distance between state s and the home state of candidate c, where the measure is relative to the distance between state s and Kerry's home state of Massachusetts. After the rst step, or pre-Iowa, analysis, we regress the estimated xed e ects on this distance measure and use the residuals from this regression as an estimate of unobserved preferences ( cs ): As shown at the bottom of columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 , distance has a negative and statistically signi cant e ect on voting decisions, as re ected in polling data. After accounting for this observed dimension of preferences, the regional advantages enjoyed by candidates are diminished although the home state advantage enjoyed by Kerry and Edwards remains. As shown in Table 2 , the estimated variance of unobserved preferences ( 2 ) is reduced in this model, re ecting the assumption that some component of preferences are observed by voters in other states. The other key parameters are qualitatively similar to those in column 1.
The second speci cation relaxes the assumption that underlying voter preferences are stable over the campaign. Trends in candidate-speci c preferences could of course confound the estimation of social learning e ects. To address this issue, we estimate a model with a candidate-speci c trend ( c ) in preferences. Then, aggregate voting returns are adjusted as follows:
where t is normalized to equal zero on the date of the Iowa primary. It is then straightforward to show that the social learning rule is adjusted as follows:
Thus, voters in late states incorporate these trends into their expectations of candidate performance. As shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 , the pre-Iowa trends tended to favor Dean and Edwards, while Kerry was disadvantaged. Thus, at the time of the Iowa primary, the mean evaluation of Dean and Edwards are higher than are those in the baseline speci cation. This is re ected in the rst row of Table 1 . As shown in Table 2 , however, the key social learning parameters here are similar to those in the baseline speci cation.
Alternative Explanations
In the baseline model, we have assumed sincere voting, under which voters support the candidate that provides the highest expected utility level. We have thus abstracted from strategic voting, several forms of which provide alternative, non-learning explanations for our documented momentum results. The rst form of strategic voting involves electability considerations associated with the general election. For example, consider a voter who prefers Dean over Kerry as president but prefers either over Bush. This voter may learn that Kerry is more popular among other voters after
Iowa and thus has a better chance of defeating Bush in the general election; this voter may thus switch to Kerry after Iowa, and this electabilty-driven switching provides an alternative explanation for our results. Importantly, all three of these alternative explanations for our measured momentum e ects involve learning about the preferences of other voters rather than underlying candidate quality, as is emphasized by our social learning model. Thus, to distinguish between strategic voting explanations and social learning explanations, we examine the dynamics of measures of candidate quality, which we proxy by auxiliary questions in which voters evaluated candidates on a 1-10 scale for the following candidate characteristics: favorability, cares about people like me, inspiring, strong leader, trustworthy, shares my values, knowledgeable, and reckless. These characteristics can be interpreted as measures of candidate quality given that they are arguably traits that would be valued by all voters regardless of ideology.
More concretely, for each of these quality proxies, we run the following regression:
where ct is the mean candidate quality at time t as implied by our estimated model and re ected in gure 7 and quality itc is measured relative to Kerry. Under our assumption of sincere voting, we would expect > 0, whereas, as argued above, there should be no link ( = 0) under strategic voting explanations given that voters only learn about the preferences of other voters from early returns.
As shown in Table 3 , there is a strong link between these factors, providing support for our social learning story. The rst six measures have the expected positive coe cients under a social learning story, whereas the coe cient associated with the measure of \reckless" has the expected negative sign. The nal two measures, however, are statistically insigni cant, likely re ecting the reduced sample sizes.
14 One important caveat of this analysis is that it does not rule out these alternative explanations if some voters act in a sincere manner whereas others act strategically.
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Even if other motives are present, however, this analysis does provide strong support for the presence of social learning among at least a subset of voters.
Counterfactual simulations
In order to further highlight the importance of momentum and social learning in sequential elections, we next provide two counterfactual simulations: simultaneous voting and alternative ordering of states under a sequential system.
Simultaneous primary
We rst consider an election in which every state votes in a simultaneous national primary on Rather, we hope that the heightened competition under a counterfactual simultaneous election helps to further reinforce our ndings of herding in favor of Kerry under the sequential primary system.
Alternative sequential schedules
Our second counterfactual election involves changes in the voting order under a sequential schedule.
To the extent that herding occurs under a sequential election, then the voting outcome may be fragile, or sensitive to the order of voting. To investigate this issue, we randomly generated alternative voting sequences, holding constant the number of states voting on each date. Again, we consider a two-candidate election, in which all states are included, and a three-candidate election, in which only states voting prior to and including Wisconsin are included. As shown in 
